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Preface:
	 The	two	authors	of	this	article	first	became	friends	more	than	forty	years	
ago in graduate school at the University of Washington. Both of us were 
inspired	by	Professor	Hsiao	Kung-ch’uan	蕭公權, one of the great scholars of 
Chinese political thought in the twentieth century. At that time, he had retired 
from	teaching	at	the	University	but	often	visited	the	campus	for	colloquia	and	
other	 events.	Although	Chun-chieh	and	Alan’s	 subsequent	 careers	developed	
in universities geographically distant from each other, the former at National 
Taiwan University and the latter at a new campus of the University of 
Washington, we have reconnected later in life and discovered that Professor 
Hsiao’s	insights	into	the	Confucian	tradition	have	continued	to	illuminate	our	
scholarship throughout the years. 
 Chun-chieh has focused his attention on the impact of the Confucian 
thinker Mencius on Chinese political thought, as well as the impact of 
Confucianism on the East Asian region in general. Alan has complemented 
his scholarship on China with a focus on the world as a whole, trying to 
understand	how	the	lessons	of	governance	revealed	by	China	and	by	the	rise	
and	fall	of	human	civilizations	might	be	applied	to	the	world	today.	Given	the	
confluence	of	our	two	careers	and	the	challenges	of	governance	faced	by	the	
increasingly	 interdependent	world	we	 live	 in,	we	have	both	 found	ourselves	
returning for inspiration to the well of Confucian humanistic wisdom that has 
nurtured Chinese intellectuals for more than two thousand years. This essay is 
a discussion of some of the key terms in Chinese historiography in the past, 
followed	 by	 some	 thoughts	 on	 how	 those	 terms,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 holistic	
worldview that emerged in the great intellectual synthesis of Confucius and 
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then	of	Zhu	Xi,	might	be	 relevant	 to	 the	great	 issues	of	our	present	age.	We	
do	not	claim	to	have	answers.	Nevertheless,	we	believe	that	China—and	Asia	
in	general—deserves	 to	play	a	greater	 leadership	role	 in	shaping	 the	 twenty-
first	 century.	 For	 two	 centuries,	 China	 has	 been	 a	 mirror	 to	 the	 world,	
reflecting	 the	 ideas	 and	 institutions	 of	 the	 outside	 world.	 Now	 the	 world	
needs	it	to	be	a	lamp,	illuminating	a	path	into	the	future	by	offering	guidance	
on	global	statecraft—jingshi 經世.
1. Introduction: East Asian Historical Thinking and the 
Historiographical Tradition
	 The	Chinese	historiographical	 tradition	 is	 long,	and	 it	 stands	 tall	beside	
the	European	tradition.	When	looking	at	what	qualities	most	comprehensively	
manifest	 the	basic	characteristics	of	East	Asian	culture	and	thinking,	nothing	
is more long-lasting than the tradition of historical thinking. Since 841 BCE, 
China	has	preserved	documentary	historical	records,	a	long,	unbroken	period	
of	 close	 to	 three	 thousand	 years.	 Chinese	 historians	 wrote	 about	 events	 in	
order	 to	 seek	principles	behind	 them,	 just	as	one	 follows	a	wave	 in	order	 to	
find	 its	 source.	As	Zhang	Xuecheng 章學誠 (1738–1801) said, “By narrating 
events	 in	 order	 to	 reveal	 principle,	 talking	 about	 li 理,	 the	 events	 become	 a	
model.”1	The	power	of	Chinese	history	lay	in	seeking	to	blend	principle	and	
events	 into	 a	 seamless	 whole,	 one	 whose	 value	 lay	 in	 the	 ability	 to	 think	
deeply	about	and	extract	 the	hidden	meaning	of	specific	historical	 facts.	The	
historian Jao Tsung-I 饒宗頤 (1917–) has said, “Historians esteemed talking 
about	historical	events,	put	great	worth	on	evaluating	history	based	on	moral	
virtue,	and	definitely	did	not	promote	altering	virtue	based	on	history.”2 Over 
thousands of years, Chinese historians have upheld innate knowledge, 
analyzed	ancient	events	and	the	rise	and	fall	of	generations,	passed	judgment	
on	 the	 virtuous	 and	 the	 wicked,	 punished	 the	 wicked	 and	 flattered	 those	
already dead, and revealed the dim light of those with hidden virtue.3 
Historians	 used	 a	 giant	 pen	 to	 alleviate	 the	 suffering	 among	 the	 people,	 to	
console	the	souls	of	those	in	history	who	have	suffered,	and	to	make,	among	
the readers of history, the dishonest honest and the weak strong, in order to 
strengthen their resolution and gain control of themselves.
	 In	 order	 to	write	 about	 the	 past,	 present,	 and	 future,	Chinese	 historians	
 1 Zhang Xuecheng 章學誠,	“Yuan	Dao	xia	原道下,” in Yeh Ying 葉瑛 ed, Wenshi Tongyi 
Jiaozhu 文史通義校注 (Beijing:	Zhonghua	Shuju,	1994), Vol.2, p.139.
 2 Jao Tsung-I 饒宗頤, Zhongguo Shixue shangzhi Zhengtong Lun 中國史學上之正統論 
(Hong	Kong:	Longmen	Shuju,	1976), p.57.
 3 Qian Mu 錢穆, Shixue Daoyan 史學導言 [Introduction to History], in Qian Binsi 
Xiangsheng	Quanji	錢賓四先生全集 [Complete Works of Qian Mu] (Taipei:	Lianjing	
chuban	gongsi,	1998),	Vol.32,	p.68.
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established	norms,	principles,	value	judgments,	and	factual	judgments	in	their	
historical works.4 The historical discussions in the writings of Chinese histo-
rians	 from	 the	 period	 of	 Spring	 and	 Autumn	 became	 the	 main	 current	 of	
Chinese historiography. After the narration of important events in the 
Zuozhuan 左傳,	 historians	 used	 the	 form	 “the	 gentleman	 said”	 to	 judge	 the	
mistakes	and	achievements	of	historical	persons,	 the	causes,	and	 the	benefits	
and losses of historical events. The Grand Historian Sima Qian 司馬遷 
(145–90BCE)	 used	 “one	 person’s	words”	 to	 understand	 “the	 changes	 of	 the	
present and past,” and in the narration of each palace event, he used the term 
“The	 Grand	 Historian	 remarks”	 to	 interject	 his	 own	 interpretation	 of	 the	
historical	 record	and	 thereby	 to	 join	 the	past	and	present	 in	a	 single	whole.5 
Ban Gu 班固 (32–92), in the History of the Former Han (漢書), put at the end 
of each narrated entry the word “zan 贊,”	or	 remark;	Fan	Ye 范曄 (398–445) 
used “ping 評,” or comments; Sima Guang 司馬光 (1019–1086), in the 
Northern Song, used “I, Guang, say 臣光曰” in weighing historical events and 
criticizing the intentions of those in control of events. Twenty centuries later, 
the great historian Chen Yinke 陳寅恪 (1890–1969), in the Tangdai zhengzhi 
shishu lungao6, used the phrase “Yinke respectfully comments 寅恪案” to 
mark his own interpretation. All of them were continuing the inherited prac-
tices of the historiographical tradition. 
	 The	 tradition	 of	 Chinese	 historiography	 also	 became	 the	 model	 for	
historians	in	the	region	of	East	Asia.	For	example,	in	1145,	the	supervisor	of	
writing the national history, Kim Bu-sik 金富軾 (1075–1150), wrote the 
Samguk Sagi by	organizing	a	narration	of	historical	events	of	the	three	king-
doms	of	Silla,	Goguryeo,	and	Baekje	on	 the	Korean	peninsula.	This	was	 the	
first	 work	 of	 history	 on	 the	 Korean	 peninsula.7 It was divided into annals, 
chronological	 tables,	 treatises,	 records,	 and	 biographies.	 To	 the	 annals	 and	
biographies	were	often	appended	remarks	 to	comment	on	and	 judge	 individ-
uals,	 to	 embody	 Kim	 Bu-sik’s	 intention	 of	 establishing	 the	 orthodox	 trans-
mission	 of	 the	 Silla	 dynasty,	 and	 to	 express	 his	 perspective	 on	 events,	 on	
mythology, and on the Bohai region.8 During the Japanese occupation of 
 4 Chun-chieh Huang 黃俊傑,	“Zhongguo	Lishi	Xiezuo	zhong	Shilun	de	zuoyong	ji	qi	
Lilun Wenti 中國歷史寫作中史論的作用及其理論問題,” in Rujia Sixiang yu Zhongguo 
Lishi Siwei 儒家思想與中國歷史思維 (Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 
2014),	Chap.2,	p.55–86.
	 5	 Xu	 Fuguan	徐復觀, Liang Han Sixiangshi 兩漢思想史 (Taipei:	 Xuesheng	 Shuju,	
1979), Vol.3, p.321–337.
	 6	 Chen	Yinke	陳寅恪, Tangdai Zhengzhi shishu lungao 唐代政治史述論稿 (Shanghai: 
Shangwu yinshuguan, 1947).
 7 Kim Bu-sik 金富軾 김부식, Samguksagi 三國史記 삼국사기 (Tokyo: Xuesiyuan 
Dongyang	Wenhua	Yenjiusuo,	1964).
 8 Cf. Miaowei 苗威,“Guanyu Jinfushi Lishiguan de tantao 關於金富軾歷史觀的探討,” in 
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Taiwan (1895–1945), the Taiwanese historian Lian Heng 連橫 (1878–1936) 
completed his Comprehensive History of Taiwan,9	 in	 which	 each	 chapter’s	
beginning	and	end	often	used	the	phrase	“Lian	Heng	says”	to	cover	in	detail	
his concept of ethnic groups and caste.10 The phrase lunyue 論曰 in the 
Samguk Sagi and “Lian Heng yue” 連橫曰 in the Comprehensive History of 
Taiwan	 both	 illustrate	 the	 Chinese	 historiographical	 tradition	 and	 its	 conti-
nuity in Korean and Taiwanese historiography. 
	 However,	in	judgments	of	historical	facts	and	the	daily	events	of	people	
in the Samguk Sagi and the Comprehensive History of Taiwan, the many value 
judgments	 that	were	applied	were	mostly	hidden	and	not	obvious.	 In	discus-
sions	 of	 the	 value	 judgments	 seen	 in	 historical	 documents,	 historiographical	
works	 are	 obviously	 very	 diverse;	 therefore,	 the	 key	 points	 of	 Chinese	
historical thought most often covered in this essay will focus on the core of 
historical thinking and on classifying the main categories of historiographical 
thinking. The four divisions of this essay are: 1) the purpose of studying 
history; 2) the driving force in historical development; 3) the operating laws 
of history; and 4) the golden age of history. This article will focus on classi-
fying	and	analyzing	and	discussing	the	meanings	of	the	specific	core	terms	of	
historical thinking.
2. The Purpose of Studying History: Comprehensiveness and 
Statecraft
 In looking at the ultimate purpose of studying history, and in weighing 
historical events, Chinese historiographers have most often applied two terms: 
tong 通 (comprehensiveness) and jingshi 經世 (statecraft). Since Sima Qian, 
or for the past two thousand years of Chinese historiography, the term “tong” 
has	been	a	core	 term.	The	Grand	Historian,	 in	his	 letter	 to	Ren	Shaoqing	任
少卿 (124–202),	 expressed	 his	 intention	 in	writing	 the	 Shiji, stating, “Being 
humbly	ambitious,	I	have	relied	on	my	untalented	language,	collected	lost	old	
documents	from	all	over,	to	examine	the	processes	and	operations	of	history,	
and	 to	 investigate	 the	 basic	 principle	 of	 success	 and	 failure	 and	 flourishing	
and	decline.	In	these	altogether	130	chapters	I	aim	to	explore	the	relationship	
between	heaven	and	humanity,	 to	achieve	a	comprehensive	understanding	of	
Shehui Kexue Zhanxian 社會科學戰線, (2012: 3), p.101–108.
 9 Lian Heng 連橫, Taiwan Tongshi 臺灣通史[Comprehensive History of Taiwan] 
(Shanghai:	Huadong	Shifan	Daxue	chubanshe,	2006).
10 Cf. Chen Zhaoying 陳昭瑛, “Lian Heng de Taiwan tongshi yu Qingdai Gongyang 
Sixiang	連橫的《臺灣通史》與清代公羊思想,” and “Lian Heng Taiwan tongshi zhong de 
minzu	 gainian:	 jiuxue	 yu	 xinyi	連橫《臺灣通史》中的「民族」概念：舊學與新義,” in her 
Taiwan yu chuantong Wenhua 臺灣與傳統文化 (Taiwan: National Taiwan University 
Press, 2005), pp.104–124 and pp.125–144.
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the	changes	 from	ancient	 times	 to	 the	present,	 in	order	 to	establish	a	unified	
outlook.”11
 The meaning of the term “tong”	was	maintained	continuously	by	Chinese	
historians through successive dynasties. The Tang dynasty scholar Du Yiu 杜
佑 in the Tong dian (801),12 the Southern Song Zheng Qiao 鄭樵 (1104–1162) 
in the Tong zhi (1161),13 and Ma Duanlin 馬端臨 (1254–1324/5) in the Wenxian 
tongkao14 all used the concept of “tong” to gain a complete knowledge of the 
causes of rises and falls in the Chinese historical system.15	 From	 the	 Tang	
dynasty Shi tong	of	Liu	Zhiji	劉知幾 (661–721) and the Zizhi tongjian of Sima 
Guang 司馬光 (1019–1086) to the Wenshi tongyi of Zhang Xuecheng 章學誠 
(1738–1801) in the eighteenth century, all upheld the concept of tong in their 
various histories. Therefore, Ban Gu 班固 (32–92), having divided history into 
periods, is not awarded high stature among traditional Chinese historiogra-
phers,	even	to	the	extent	of	Ma	Duanlin	saying	that	“comparing	Sima	Qian	to	
Ban Gu is like comparing a dragon to a pig.”16 Zhang Xuecheng regarded the 
Chunqiu	 as	 the	 beginning	 of	 Chinese	 historiography,	 its	 purpose	 to	 “cover	
comprehensively the changes from ancient times to the present, so as to make 
it	 one’s	 own	 philosophy.”17 We can therefore say that “tong”	 is	 the	 first	
principle of Chinese historiography, and the most important key term in 
Chinese historical thinking.
 The second most important purpose in the study of Chinese historiography 
was jingshi 經世 “statecraft.” Chinese historiographers industriously gathered 
historical	material	and	were	 inspired	not	only	 to	have	a	desire	 to	explain	 the	
world,	but	even	more	to	have	a	desire	to	change	the	world,	and	they	believed	
that the way to change the world was to write works of history that distin-
guished	 those	 who	 deserved	 praise	 and	 blame,	 or	 the	 worthy	 and	 the	
unworthy,	 and	works	 that	 used	 historical	writings	 and	 explanations	 to	make	
the	world	a	better	place.
 Sima Guang used the annalistic method to compile the Zizhi tongjian, 
11 Sima Qian 司馬遷,	 “Bao	 Ren	 An	 shu	報任安書,” in Ban Gu 班固, Hanshu 漢書 
[History of the Former Han] (Taipei:	Yiwen	Yinshuguan,	1956),	 juan	62,	p.1257.
12 Du Yiu 杜佑, Tong Dian 通典 (Beijing:	Zhonghua	shuju,	1988).
13 Zheng Qiao 鄭樵, Tong Zhi 通志 (Beijing:	Zhonghua	shuju,	1987).
14 Ma Duanlin 馬端臨, Wenxian Tongkao 文獻通考 (Beijing:	Zhonghua	shuju,	1986).
15	 Cf.	Hok-lam	Chan,	“‘Comprehensiveness’	(T’ung)	and	‘Change’	(Pien) in Ma Tuan-
lin’s	Historical	Thought,”	in	Hok-lam	Chan	and	Wm.	Theodore	de	Bary	eds.,	Yüan 
Thought: Chinese Thought and Religion Under the Mongols (New	York:	Columbia	
University Press, 1982), pp.27–88.
16	 Ma	 Duanlin,	 “Jingji	 kao	經籍考,” in Wenxian Tongkao (Beijing:	 Zhonghua	 shuju,	
1986),	Vol.2,	p.1622.
17 Zhang Xuecheng 章學誠, “Da Ke Wen Shang 答客問上,” in Ye Ying 葉瑛 ed., Wenshi 
Tongyi Jiaozhu 文史通義校注, Vol.5, p.470.
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narrating	 1,362	 years	 of	 historical	 events.	Although	 he	 never	 used	 the	 term	
“jingshi,” it is easy to see that he emphasized the practical uses of historiog-
raphy	 to	 exhort	 and	 enlighten.	 In	 explaining	 his	 purpose	 in	 compiling	 the	
Zizhi tongjian,	 Sima	Guang	 himself	 said,	 “I	 only	 desired	 to	write	 about	 the	
rise	 and	 fall	 of	 the	 states,	 the	 joys	 and	 sorrows	 of	 people,	 so	 that	 observers	
could select for themselves what they liked or disliked, what worked and 
what	failed,	in	order	to	protect	themselves;	it	wasn’t	like	the	Chunqiu, to lay 
down	 the	 rules	 for	 praise	 and	 blame.	 It	 was	 really	 to	 bring	 order	 out	 of	
chaos.”18	 In	 his	memorial	 submitted	 to	 emperor	 Shenzong,	 he	 echoed	 those	
sentiments: “The Zizhi tongjian principally aimed at chronicling the rise and 
fall	of	the	states,	and	was	concerned	with	the	joys	and	sorrows	of	people,	so	
that	 they	 could	 take	 the	 best	 as	 a	model,	 and	 guard	 against	 the	worst.”19 In 
Zhang	Xuecheng’s	statement	 that	“the	concept	of	statecraft	 in	historiography	
was	definitely	not	empty	talk,”20 written in the eighteenth century, one can see 
the	 basic	 essence	 of	 traditional	 Chinese	 historiographical	 works	 and	 the	
second main reason for the purpose of the study of Chinese history.
3. The Driving Force in Historical Development: Propensity, 
Principle, and Ritual
 In Chinese historical thinking concerning the key terms for the motive 
forces of historical development, there are three concepts: 1) propensity 
(shi 勢); 2) principle (li 理); and 3) ritual (li 禮). We will consider these three 
terms in order.
 1) Propensity (Shi 勢). When Chinese historiographers pondered the 
driving force of history, the most important key term was shi, propensity. In 
the history of ancient Chinese thought, the concept of shi was divided into 
temporal propensity, shishi 時勢, and situational propensity, xingshi 形勢. The 
former was concerned with time, and the latter, with space. 
 Sima Qian in the Shiji often used the term xingshi, as in chapter 17, “The 
Chronological	 Table	 of	 the	 Feudal	 Lords	 from	 the	 Beginning	 of	 the	 Han”:	
“[When] the great states of the feudal lords rose to power, the Son of Heaven 
was	 too	weak	 to	 be	 able	 to	 restore	 them	 to	 order.	 It	was	 not	 that	 his	 virtue	
lacked	 purity,	 but	 that	 the	 circumstances	 rendered	 him	 helpless.”21 And in 
18 Sima Guang 司馬光,	 “Weiji	 (1) 魏紀一,” in Xinjiao Zizhi Tongjian zhu 新校資治通 
(Taipei:	Shijie	shuju,	1976),	 juan	69,	p.2187.
19 Sima Guang 司馬光,	“Jinshu	biao	進書表,” in Xinjiao Zizhi Tongjian zhu,	p.9607.
20 Zhang Xuecheng 章學誠, “Zhedong Xueshu 浙東學術,” in Ye Ying 葉瑛 ed., Wenshi 
Tongyi Jiaozhu 文史通義校注,	 juan	5,	p.524.
21 Sima Qian 司馬遷,	“Hanxing	yilai	Zhuhowang	nianbiao	漢興以來諸侯王年表,” in Shiji
史記 [Historian’s Record] (Beijing:	 Zhonghua	 Shuju,	 1959),	 Bk.3,	 juan	 17,	 p.801.	
The	 English	 translation	 follows	 Burton	 Watson’s	 translation	 of	 the	 Shiji (vol.1, 
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chapter	 65,	 “Biographies	 of	 Sunzi	孫子 and Wu Qi 吳起”: “Wu Qi said that 
the	military	 lords	 believed	 that	 situational	 power	was	 not	 as	 good	 as	 virtue,	
so	when	 applied	 to	Chu,	 by	 being	 cruel	 and	 tyrannical,	 they	 lost	 their	 very	
bodies.”22 Sima Qian called it one of the driving factors of history, a struc-
tural factor apart from any single individual motive, as in economic or 
geographical factors, similar to what the English historian Peter Burke 
(1937–) calls the “collective agency” in Western historical thinking.23 
	 However,	Chinese	thinkers	and	historiographers,	in	talking	about	historical	
“situational	 power,”	 apart	 from	 their	 focus	 on	 objective	 “collective	 factors,”	
stressed	the	more	active	qualities	of	people	in	contemporary	historical	trends.	
When Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200)	spoke	about	the	changes	from	ancient	times	
to	 the	 present,	 although	 he	 said	 “such-and-such	 was	 not	 done	 by	 human	
action,”24 he especially emphasized on the other hand that “only sages are 
able	 to	 find	 their	 principle	 in	 the	midst	 of	 constant	 change.”25	 Zhu	Xi	 defi-
nitely	did	not	consider	individuals	to	be	mere	objects	ruled	by	the	uncontrol-
lable	currents	of	history.	Twenty	years	after	Zhu	Xi,	the	historian	Ye	Shi	葉適 
(1150–1223),	 in	 examining	 those	 who	 dominated	 history,	 also	 wrote,	 “The	
sages of the past, such as Yao 堯, Shun 舜, Yu 禹, Tang 湯, Wen 文, Wu 武, 
Gaozu 高祖, and Guangwu 光武 in the Han, and Taizong 太宗 in the Tang, saw 
themselves as using the power of heaven. Although their merits and virtues 
were	 deep,	 and	 the	 results	 of	 their	 rule	 broad,	 yet	 the	 power	 of	 heaven	 lay	
with them and not with circumstances.”26 Ye Shi was similar to other Chinese 
thinkers. All stressed the power of individuals in history to control events.
 2) Principle (Li 理). The second concept that is most often regarded in 
Chinese	 historical	 thought	 as	 the	 most	 commonly	 used	 explanation	 for	 the	
developmental forces of history is principle, li. Li was a core term in Chinese 
historical thinking. After the rise of neo-Confucianism in the eleventh 
century, the term profoundly permeated the later phenomena of Chinese 
historical thought. In the Northern Song, Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033–1107),27 along 
p.488).
22 Sima Qian 司馬遷, “Sunzi Wu Qi Liezhuan 孫子吳起列傳,” in Shiji 史記 [Historian’s 
Record],	Bk.7,	juan	65,	p.2169.
23	 Peter	Burke,	 “Western	Historical	Thinking	 in	 a	Global	Perspective:	 10	Theses,”	 in	
Jörn	Rüsen	 ed.,	Western Historical Thinking: An Intercultural Debate (New York, 
Oxford:	Berghahn	Books,	2002), pp.15–30.
24	 Zhuxi	朱熹, “Gushi Yulun 古史餘論,” in Zhuzi wenji 朱子文集 [Literary Corpus of 
Master Zhu Xi],	Bk.7,	juan	72,	p.3639.
25	 Ibid.
26 Ye Shi 葉適, “Zhishi 治勢,” in Shuixin Xiansheng wenji 水心先生文集 [Literary 
Corpus of Mister Shuixin] (Taipei:	 Taiwan	 Shangwu	 Yinshuguan,	 1965	 Sibu	
congkan	chubian	suoben),	 juan	4,	p.53.
27 Cheng Yi 程頤、Cheng Hao 程顥, Henan Chengshi yishu 河南程氏遺書 [Surviving 
10 Journal of Cultural Interaction in East Asia   Vol. 9  2018
with Zhang Zai 張載 (1027–1077), used the concept of the principle of 
heaven, tianli 天理,	 to	explain	the	historical	traces	of	Yao	and	Shun.28
	 In	 his	 explanation	 of	 history,	 Zhu	 Xi	 used	 li (and sometimes dao) to 
describe	 the	 motive	 power	 of	 historical	 development.	 He	 pointed	 out	 that	
during the period of the Three Dynasties 三代 (san dai), it was popular to 
attribute	the	collapse	of	the	Qin	and	Han	to	an	overflow	of	emotions;	he	used	
li to gain a complete knowledge of his historical perspective valuing the 
ancient	past.	Zhu	Xi’s	use	of	history	to	explain	li,	since	it	was	both	a	natural	
law	and	a	human	standard,	was	both	historical	actuality	and	also	a	normative	
imperative.29 Zhu Xi sometimes saw this motive power of historical develop-
ment as “the natural power of li.”30 
 3)	Ritual	(Li 禮), ritual or ceremony. Sima Guang was a representative of 
those Chinese historiographers who took the li of ritual as the motive power 
of history. The Zizhi tongjian	he	compiled	narrated	the	development	of	1,362	
years of Chinese history, from 403BCE to 959CE. He emphasized that the 
most important factor in the driving force of history was li. The origin of li 
was	related	 to	 the	ceremonies	and	sacrifices	 to	 the	gods	and	ancestors	 in	 the	
society	of	 remote	 antiquity,	 and	 it	 then	 spread	 to	become	 the	 standard	norm	
for all human relationships. By the Spring and Autumn period (722–
481BCE), people had already taken li	 to	be	 the	“basic	core	of	 the	 individual	
self”31	or	the	“basic	core	of	the	country.”32 The reference to li as “that which 
manages	the	country,	establishes	the	altars	to	the	gods	of	earth	and	grain,	puts	
in	 order	 the	 people,	 and	 benefits	 all	 descendants”33	 became	 the	 common	
understanding	 of	 the	 term	 during	 the	 Spring	 and	Autumn	 period.	 The	 first	
historical	 event	 that	 Sima	 Guang	 described	 in	 the	 Zizhi tongjian was the 
Works of the Henan Chengs], collected in Er Cheng ji 二程集 [Complete Works of 
the Two Chengs] (Beijing:	Zhonghua	shuju,	1981),	 juan	6,	pp.3–7.
28 Zhang Zai 張載,	“	Jingxue	Liku	經學理窟 [Explanations	of	the	Learning	of	Classics],” 
in Zhang Zai ji 張載集 [Complete Works of Zhang Zai] (Beijing:	 Zhonghua	 shuju,	
1978),	p.256.
29 See Chun-chieh Huang 黃俊傑, Rujia Sixiang yu Zhongguo Lishi Siwei 儒家思想與中
國歷史思維,	chap.6,	p.184.
30 Li Jingde 黎靖德 ed., “Yi Gang lu 義剛錄,” in Zhuzi yulei 朱子語類 [Classified 
Conversations of Master Zhu], collected in Zhuzi Quanshu 朱子全書 [Complete works 
of Master Zhu] (Shanghai:	 Shanghai	 Guji	 chubanshe;	 Hefei:	 Anhui	 Jiaoyu	
chubanshe,	2002),	Vol.18,	juan	139,	p.4296.
31	 Yang	Bojun	楊伯峻, Chunqiu Zuozhuan Zhu 春秋左傳注 [Commentaries on the Zuo 
Commentaries of the Spring and Autumn Annals] (Beijing:	Zhonghua	shuju,	1981,	
1990),	Vol.2,	p.860.
32	 Yang	Bojun	楊伯峻, Chunqiu Zuozhuan Zhu 春秋左傳注 [Commentaries on the Zuo 
Commentaries of the Spring and Autumn Annals], Vol.1, “Xi Gong shiyi nian 僖公
十一年,” p.338.
33	 Yang	Bojun,	Chunqiu Zuozhuan Zhu, Vol.1, “Yin Gong shiyi nian 隱公十一年,”	p.76.
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threefold division of Jin 晉 in 403BCE. After narrating events here, Sima 
Guang uses the phrase “chen Guang yue” 臣光曰 (Your servant Guang says) 
to open his discussion, emphasizing that “there is no greater duty of a prince 
than li, with li nothing greater than analysis, with analysis nothing greater than 
reputation	 for	 integrity—this	was	 the	 celebrated	 ‘discussion	 of	 analysis	 and	
reputation mingfen lun 名分論.’”34 One can say that li was the most important 
term	 in	 Sima	 Guang’s	 historical	 explanations,	 whether	 or	 not	 it	 evolved	 to	
become	the	dominant	form	of	history.	
4. The Operating Laws of History: Dao 道 and Xin 心
 In Chinese historical thinking, the terms dao and xin are the most 
important	terms	for	describing	the	laws	of	history.
 1) Dao 道: Since the time of the Spring and Autumn period, the term dao, 
whether or not it was used throughout the Chinese world, was the standard of 
judgment	 and	 conduct	 for	 the	 sages	 and	men	of	 virtue	 to	 decide	whether	 to	
take	or	leave	office.	Confucius	said,	“Should	the	Way	fail	to	prevail,	I	would	
put to sea on a raft,”35	and	advised	a	gentleman	to	“Let	yourself	be	seen	when	
the	Way	 prevails	 in	 the	 empire,	 but	 keep	 out	 of	 sight	 when	 it	 does	 not.”36 
Confucius	believed	that	“When	the	Way	prevails	in	the	Empire,	the	rites	and	
music	and	punitive	expeditions	are	 initiated	by	the	Emperor”;	and	if	 the	dao 
does	 not	 prevail,	 then	 “they	 are	 initiated	 by	 the	 feudal	 lords.”37 Zhang 
Xuecheng said, “The origin of history is rooted in the Chunqiu; the meaning 
of the Chunqiu is clearly shown in the way it corrects the composition. The 
meaning	 of	 correcting	 the	 composition	 was	 undoubtedly	 to	 give	 laws	 to	
heaven and man, and to advocate the great Way.”38 Historical writings 
confirm	 the	 efficacy	 of	 the	 term	 dao in history. The Grand Historian Sima 
Qian,	in	writing	the	biography	of	Boyi	(伯夷列傳), wrote that in conveying the 
story of Bo Yi and Shu Qi, he encountered feelings of endless sorrow and 
regret,	 raising	 doubts	 whether	 or	 not	 there	 was	 “a	 dao of Heaven” in 
history.39
	 When	we	get	to	Zhu	Xi’s	historical	explanations,	the	term	“dao”	becomes	
even	more	 the	 operant	model	 for	 history.	 Zhu	Xi	 talks	 about	 history	 in	 the	
34 Sima Guang 司馬光,	 Hu	 Sanxing	 zhu	胡三省注, Zhang Yu 章鈺 eds., Xinjiao Zizhi 
Tongjianzhu 新校資治通鑑注,	 juan	1,	pp.2–3.
35 D. C. Lau trans., The Analects (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1992), 
Bk. V, Chap.7, p.37.
36 D. C. Lau trans., The Analects, Bk. VIII, Chap.13, p.73.
37 D. C. Lau trans., The Analects,	Bk.	XVI,	Chap.2,	p.163.
38 Zhang Xuecheng 章學誠, “Da kewen shang 答客問上,” in Ye Ying 葉瑛 ed., Wenshi 
Tongyi Jiaozhu 文史通義校注,	 juan	5,	p.470.
39 Sima Qian司馬遷, “Boyi Liezhuan 伯夷列傳,” in Shiji 史記,	 juan	61,	p.852.
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Dachen tongfuba: “Ren	refers	to	a	specific	person,	and	dao	refers	to	a	specific	
dao—is	that	not	the	difference	between	the	periods	of	the	three	dynasties,	the	
Han and the Tang?”40	Zhu	Xi	believed	 that	 the	dao was the practical law of 
history,	stating,	“From	ancient	 times	 to	 the	present	 there	 is	only	one	system;	
those who follow it succeed, and those who defy it fail.”41 He furthermore 
said	 that	 if	 rulers	 “significantly	 lack	 the	dao,” then history would enter into 
“a kind of primal chaos, human society would collapse, and rise again 
another day.”42	 Zhu	 Xi	 believed	 that	 the	 explanations	 of	 Chinese	 history	
demonstrated a kind of “worship of ancient historical outlook,” and that the 
dao of Yao, Shun, the three kings, Zhougong, and Confucius was never 
implemented in heaven or earth for even one day.”43
 2) [Xin 心 heart]  The practical principle in Chinese historical thinking 
lies	 in	 the	 purity	 of	 the	 ruler’s	 “heart.”	 Chinese	 historiographers	were	 satu-
rated	in	traditional	Confucian	thought,	believing	deeply	that	to	see	whether	or	
not history followed the right path, one must look closely at the “heart” of 
the rulers. Mencius therefore said that one must take “rectifying the evils in 
the	prince’s	heart”	 as	 the	key	 task.44	At	 the	 end	of	 the	Ming	and	 the	begin-
ning	 of	 the	 Qing,	 Wang	 Fuzhi	 (1619–1692)	 created	 a	 broad	 overview	 of	
historical successes and failures. In pointing out the practical principles of 
history,	 he	 said	 that	 “the	qualifications	 to	 rule	 are	 solely	 in	 the	heart.	 If	 one	
uses	 the	 heart	 to	 govern,	 then	 whoever	 rules	 cannot	 avoid	 benefiting	 the	
people…Therefore	the	qualifications	of	a	ruler	lie	only	in	the	heart,	and	form	
a mirror to history.”45	In	Chinese	historical	thinking,	history	becomes	a	matter	
of making concrete the good and evil of the human heart (particularly the 
heart of the ruler) and the process of its development.
5. The Golden Age of History: The Three Dynasties
	 In	Chinese	traditional	historical	thought	has	always	existed	a	yearning	to	
40 Zhu Xi 朱熹, “Da Chen Tongfu Ba 答陳同甫八 [Eighth	Reply	 to	Chen	Tongfu],” in 
Zhuzi Wenji 朱子文集 [Literary Corpus of Master Zhu Xi],	Vol.4,	juan	36,	p.1464.
41 Zhu Xi 朱熹, “Da Chen Tongfu Jiu 答陳同甫九 [Ninth	Reply	 to	Chen	Tongfu],” in 
Zhuzi Wenji 朱子文集 [Literary Corpus of Master Zhu Xi],	Vol.4,	juan	36,	p.1466.
42 Li Jingde 黎靖德 ed., “Yang lu 揚錄,” in Zhuzi yulei 朱子語類 [Classified 
Conversations of Master Zhu], collected in Zhuzi Quanshu 朱子全書 [Complete works 
of Master Zhu] (Shanghai:	 Shanghai	 Guji	 chubanshe;	 Hefei:	 Anhui	 Jiaoyu	
chubanshe,	2002),	Vol.14,	juan	1,	p.121.
43 Zhu Xi 朱熹, “Da Chen Tongfu Liu 答陳同甫六 [Sixth	Reply	 to	Chen	Tongfu],” in 
Zhuzi Wenji 朱子文集 [Literary Corpus of Master Zhu Xi],	Vol.4,	juan	36,	p.1458.
44 D. C. Lau trans., Mencius (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1984), Vol.1, 
Bk. IV, Part A, chap.20, p.152.
45	 Wang	Fuzhi	王夫之, Du Tongjian lun 讀通鑑論 [Remarks Gathered from a Reading 
of the Comprehensive Mirror to Aid in Government] (Changsha: Yulu shushe, 1989), 
Vol.10, pp.1181–1182.
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return	 to	 the	 golden	 age	 of	 antiquity.	 This	 is	 expressed	 by	 the	 term	 “three	
dynasties”, which constantly appears in the narrative of traditional Chinese 
histories. Confucius made the Xia 夏, Shang 商, and Zhou 周 (the “three 
dynasties”) into the golden age of China, “He transmitted the ancient tradi-
tions	of	Yao	and	Shun,	and	he	modeled	after	and	made	brilliant	 the	 systems	
of King Wen and Wu.”46	 Confucius	 often	 glorified	 the	 three	 dynasties,	
comparing them with the period of Spring and Autumn. Mencius, in looking 
back	 on	 history,	 regarded	 it	 almost	 as	 a	 law	 of	 history,	 saying,	 “The	 three	
dynasties	 won	 the	 Empire	 through	 benevolence	 and	 lost	 it	 through	 cruelty.	
This is true of the rise and fall, the survival and collapse, of states as well.”47 
Confucius and Mencius, in discussing the role of the three dynasties in 
Chinese historical thinking, often saw them as related to the rise and fall of 
the dao.	 In	 regarding	 the	 three	 dynasties	 as	 the	 golden	 age	 of	 antiquity	 in	
Chinese historical thought, the historical discussions of Confucians and 
historiographers often treat it as a contrast or counterpoint to the “real 
world,” and thus have a “counter-factual” characteristic.48 
6. Conclusion on Chinese Historiographical Terms
	 This	essay	has	thus	far	discussed	and	summarized	key	terms	that	frequently	
appear	 in	 Chinese	 historical	 narrative	 and	 Chinese	 historical	 explanations.	
According	 to	 this	 essay,	Chinese	historiographers,	 in	 expressing	 the	purpose	
of	 studying	 history,	 most	 frequently	 employed	 the	 terms	 “comprehensive-
ness” (tong 通) and “statecraft” (jingshi 經世). Ever since Sima Qian, the 
phrase “to comprehend the changes from ancient times to the present” (tong 
gujin zhi bian 通古今之變)	has	been	the	unresolved	goal	of	Chinese	historians.	
Therefore, the Tongzhi, Tongdian, and Wenxian tongkao, in systematically 
carrying	 out	 the	 above-mentioned	 principle	 in	writing	 history,	 and	 the	Zizhi 
tongjian, in using the annalistic method of narrating history, provide a mirror 
to the rulers. The fact that Chinese historiography especially emphasized 
“tong gujin zhi bian” demonstrates that the main goal of writing history was 
statecraft. Chinese historiographers used not only the heart and mind to 
explain	the	world;	they	also	used	power	to	change	the	world.	
 Second, with regard to the motive of historical development, Chinese 
historiographers also focused on the three terms shi 勢, li 理, and li 禮. 
However, although Chinese historiographers admittedly emphasized the 
46 Wing-tsit Chan, trans., The Doctrine of the Mean, collected in A source Book in 
Chinese Philosophy (Princeton New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973), 
p.111.
47 D. C. Lau trans., Mencius, Vol.1, Bk. IV, Part A, chap.3, p.141.
48 See Chun-chieh Huang 黃俊傑, Rujia Sixiang yu Zhongguo Lishi Siwei 儒家思想與中
國歷史思維,	pp.115–120,	for	more	reflections	on	this	subject.
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dispositions of shi and li, and the power of structural elements, they did not 
believe	 that	 these	 inevitably	 operated	 according	 to	 some	 mechanistic	 law;	
rather, they emphasized the active agency of individuals, emphasizing that 
people had free will in order to lead history in a positive direction. 
 Third, in Chinese historical thought relating to the laws of historical 
operation, the terms most often used were dao 道 and xin 心. Chinese histori-
ographers	 deeply	 absorbed	 Confucian	 values,	 believing	 that	 in	 history,	 the	
presence	 or	 absence	 of	 dao was indicative of order or chaos, and the key 
especially	was	 in	whether	historical	figures	and	rulers	preserved	xin. All this 
shows that Chinese historical thinking was permeated with a strong spirit of 
optimism and a foundation of humanism.
	 Fourth	and	last,	the	three	dynasties	period	in	Chinese	historical	thinking	
became	the	golden	age	that	all	Chinese	historiographers	yearned	for.	Chinese	
historiographers often idealized the three dynasties in order to criticize and 
instruct real life politics, with the intention of converting the “is” of the real 
world	to	the	“ought	to	be”	of	the	virtuous	world.	The	humanistic	spirit	of	the	
tradition of Chinese historiography, and the faith in transforming the world, is 
fully manifested in this tradition.
	 From	our	discussion	here	of	the	main	terms	in	Chinese	historical	thinking,	
we can see that the aim of Chinese historiographers in writing history, and in 
writing	about	 the	driving	 force	of	history,	 the	 laws	of	historical	 change,	 and	
their yearning for the golden age, all manifested how deeply they stressed the 
role	 of	 human	 action	 in	 history.	They	believed	not	 that	 people	were	 passive	
tools	 of	 objective	 historical	 forces	 but	 that	 the	 upright	 human	 will	 was	
capable	 of	 overturning	 heaven	 and	 earth	 and	 of	 being	 a	 solid	 rock	 in	 a	
constant stream of historical change. Therefore, in the eyes of Chinese 
historiographers,	 the	 purpose	of	 studying	history	was	not	 just	 to	 accumulate	
historical	 facts.	 It	 was	 to	 receive	 heartfelt	 inspiration	 by	 reading	 about	 the	
ancient worthies and past sages and to devote oneself to making the world a 
better	place,	ordering	the	state,	and	saving	the	world.
7. Further Thoughts on the Relevance of the Chinese 
Historiographical Tradition for the Future of the World: Three 
Periods of Grand Synthesis
 This part focuses on how the terms outlined in the proceeding sections 
of	this	paper	might	be	applied	to	the	challenges	facing	the	current	generation	
of	 leaders,	 not	 only	 the	 challenges	 in	China	 but	 those	 in	 the	world	 at	 large.	
The	authors	of	 this	essay	believe	 that	 these	 terms	convey	profound	wisdom,	
and	 that	 they	 therefore	 offer	 insight	 into	 the	 problems	 we	 face	 today	 as	 a	
human	community.	As	discussed	above,	in	the	past,	the	li of principle and the 
li	 of	 ritual	 were	 rooted	 in	 a	 belief	 that	 the	 moral	 laws	 of	 human	 behavior	
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were modeled on the natural laws of the cosmos itself. When those laws were 
ignored or violated, then heaven (tian) intervened to punish the evil and 
reward	 the	 good.	 The	 historian’s	 role	 was	 to	 reveal	 those	 laws	 in	 specific	
historical events so that the future could apply the relevant lessons to prac-
tical statecraft (jingshi). The underlying assumption was that nature was 
systemic and that its fundamental essence consisted of relationships. 
Everything	 was	 assumed	 to	 be	 connected	 to	 everything	 else,	 such	 that	 the	
internal motivation of the heart (xin)	 was	 the	 key	 to	 evaluating	 external	
behavior	and	judgment.	One	could	not	gain	a	full	understanding	of	any	given	
phenomenon	 by	 looking	 only	 at	 one	 aspect	 of	 it.	 One	 had	 to	 look	 at	 the	
whole,	 at	 the	 larger	 context.	One	 had	 to	 be,	 in	 short,	 comprehensive	 (tong). 
To	be	otherwise	was	to	grasp	only	a	part	of	the	truth.	
	 All	these	perspectives	are	immediately	relevant	to	the	great	questions	of	
our	 age	 today.	This	 section	will	 outline	one	possible	 avenue	of	 “making	 the	
world	a	better	place,	ordering	 the	state,	and	saving	 the	world”	by	 looking	at	
two periods in Chinese history in the past that produced a grand synthesis of 
ideas	 and	 then	 suggesting	 that	 these	 two	 periods	 offer	 an	 insight	 into	 a	
potential	 third	period	of	synthesis	in	the	future.	The	first	period	was	the	life-
time of Confucius himself and his followers in the Eastern Zhou. The second 
period was the neo-Confucian revival of the Northern and Southern Song 
dynasty (960–1279).	We	are	now	on	the	 threshold	of	a	 third	major	period	of	
synthesis,	 this	 time	calling	for	China	 to	 take	a	global	perspective,	a	perspec-
tive	 that	 embraces	 the	 full	 expanse	 of	 all	 under	 heaven,	 tianxia. All three 
periods	share	one	important	quality—an	existential	crisis	threatening	the	very	
foundation	of	orderly	life	and	requiring	a	re-design	of	the	basic	institutions	of	
governance. 
First synthesis
 The	first	 period	of	 synthesizing	 renewal—during	 the	 time	of	Confucius	
and	then	of	Mencius—gave	rise	to	the	basic	concepts	and	terms	discussed	in	
the	 previous	 sections.	The	 Eastern	 Zhou	was	 fraught	with	 constant	 conflict.	
China was divided into hundreds of states, forming and dissolving alliances, 
competing	for	power,	and	falling	in	and	out	of	war.	The	bonds	of	trust	neces-
sary	 for	 cooperation	had	broken	down.	 In	 this	world	of	disorder,	 the	 central	
preoccupation	of	doers	and	thinkers	alike	was	governance:	how	to	re-build	a	
strong	 and	 just	 society	 in	 an	 imperfect	world.	The	 key	 insight	 of	Confucius	
and	his	followers	was	that	all	institutions	of	good	governance	must	be	rooted	
in	 the	 deepest	 yearnings	 of	 the	 human	 heart	 for	 justice	 and	 meaningful	
human	relationships.	Force	alone	is	insufficient	for	keeping	power	over	a	long	
period.	To	be	legitimate,	as	well	as	sustainable,	government	had	to	be	built	on	
a	foundation	of	a	shared	code	of	moral	behavior,	which	Confucius	 identified	
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as “humanity” (“benevolence,”	“reciprocity,”	ren 仁).	That	was	a	remarkable	
assertion,	 given	 that	 during	 his	 lifetime	 politics	 seemed	 to	 be	 far	 more	
focused on force than on moral virtue.
Second synthesis 
 The second period of renewal occurred in the Song dynasty. Then, as 
during	 the	 time	 of	 Confucius,	 China	 was	 facing	 an	 existential	 threat	 to	 the	
unity of Chinese civilization. In the 740 years from the end of the Han 
dynasty	 to	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	Northern	Song,	China	 had	 been	 divided	 for	
574 years (including the period in the Tang following the An Lushan 
Rebellion);	 in	 other	 words,	 for	 77	 percent	 of	 the	 time,	 China	 had	 been	
vulnerable	to	civil	war	or	to	attack	and	occupation	by	Central	Asian	peoples.	
Now,	in	the	tenth	century,	China	had	been	reunified	under	a	new	dynasty.	The	
question	was	how	that	unity	could	be	sustained.	The	first	step	was	to	prevent	
the rise of local military commanders, the jiedushi 節度使, who had under-
mined	 the	unity	of	China	 in	 the	Tang.	Song	 thinkers	 tackled	 the	problem	of	
how to centralize power, shi 勢,	by	advocating	a	doctrine	of	zunwang rangyi 
尊王攘夷,	 “revere	 the	 ruler	 and	 expel	 the	 barbarians.”	The	 initial	 vehicle	 for	
these ideas were commentaries on the Chunqiu, of which the most prominent 
in the Northern Song was the Chunqiu zunwang fawei 春秋尊王發微	of	Sun	Fu	
孫復 (992–1057). (In	 a	 fascinating	 example	 of	 the	 relevance	 of	 these	 early	
Song thinkers to the larger region of East Asia, the term zunwang rangyi was 
borrowed	 by	 late	Tokugawa	 reformers	 in	 Japan	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 to	
become	the	rallying	cry	of	the	Meiji	Restoration—sonno joi.)
 The underlying intention of the Song political philosophers, however, was 
not so much to concentrate power in the person of the individual ruler as it 
was to centralize the institutions of government into the hands of a highly 
educated,	 morally	 upright	 elite	 imbued	 with	 the	 ethical	 values	 of	 public	
service	 and	 the	 wisdom	 of	 historical	 experience.	 Song	 thinkers	 believed	
deeply that the strength of China depended on nothing less than the moral 
renewal	 of	 Chinese	 society.	 That	 moral	 renewal,	 in	 turn,	 required	 them	 to	
breathe	 new	 life	 into	 the	Confucian	worldview,	which	 in	 the	 centuries	 after	
the fall of the Han dynasty had lost its pride of place among the Chinese 
literati. Daoism, with its cosmological metaphysics, and Buddhism, with its 
complex	philosophical	speculation	on	the	nature	of	being	as	well	as	suffering,	
had come to dominate the intellectual terrain of China. In order to make 
Confucianism relevant to their own age, the Song thinkers had to take into 
account the perspectives of the Daoist and Buddhist worldviews that had 
claimed the attention of Chinese intellectuals for so many centuries. They did 
so	not	by	denying	the	validity	of	 those	 two	traditions	but	by	affirming	them,	
incorporating their essential truths into a new Confucian whole, a synthesis, 
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that was greater than the sum of its aggregate parts. 
 There were many thinkers in the Northern Song who laid the philo-
sophical foundation for this neo-Confucian renaissance. Common to all was a 
desire	 to	 link	 the	 terms	discussed	 in	 the	first	 part	 of	 this	 essay	 into	 a	 single	
unifying	body	of	theory,	and	to	do	so	by	drawing	on	the	Daoist	and	Buddhist	
philosophical heritage as well as the Confucian classics. The oldest of the 
group that was to have a transformative impact on this renaissance was Shao 
Yong 邵雍 (1011–1077), who was fascinated with the Yijing 易經 (Book of 
Change)	 and	 its	 exploration	of	 the	 relationship	between	numbers	 and	nature	
(much	 as	 Western	 thinkers	 were	 intrigued	 by	 the	 way	 in	 which	 mathe-
matics—a	purely	human	 invention—reveals	 fundamental	 patterns	 in	nature). 
Others	 included	 the	brothers	Cheng	Hao	程顥 (1032–1085) and Cheng Yi 程
頤 (1033–1107), who focused on principle, li, and its connection with heart-
and-mind, xin, and dao. Zhou Dunyi 周敦頤 (1017–1073) made a central 
contribution	 by	 borrowing	 from	 Daoist	 cosmology	 the	 concept	 of	 the	
Supreme Polarity, taiji 太極, a dynamic and complementary unity of oppo-
sites.49 Zhang Zai 張載(1020–1077) also focused on taiji,	which	he	believed	
to	be	the	source	of	all	the	constituent	matter	in	the	universe—qi.	Represented	
visually	by	the	taijitu 太極圖 (the yin-yang	symbol),	 this	concept	became	one	
of the central ideas of the neo-Confucian movement. 
	 These	various	threads	created	by	Northern	Song	thinkers	were	woven	into	
a	single	 tapestry	unifying	 thought	and	action	by	Zhu	Xi’s	grand	synthesis	 in	
the Southern Song. Using the agency of taiji,	 Zhu	 Xi	 joined	 into	 a	 single	
whole the two concepts of principle, li 理, and material force, qi 氣, in such a 
way	 that	 the	 central	Confucian	 virtue	 of	 reciprocity	 became	 a	manifestation	
of	 the	 basic	 nature	 of	 the	 cosmos	 itself.	 The	 result	 was	 a	 stupendous	 intel-
lectual	 achievement—a	 synthesis	 on	 a	 scale	 commensurate	 with	 that	 of	
Thomas	 Aquinas	 (1225–1274)	 in	 thirteenth-century	 Europe.	 For	 the	 next	
thousand	 years,	 Confucianism	 once	 again	 formed	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 cultural	
unity	of	China	and	the	standard	by	which	all	institutions	of	governance	were	
measured	not	only	in	China	but	in	the	East	Asian	region	as	a	whole.	
	 In	the	context	of	world	history,	the	cultural	and	political	sustainability	of	
the	 ideas	 and	 institutions	 of	 Confucian	 China	 is	 remarkable	 and	 unique.	
Lasting	for	two	thousand	years,	and	comprehending	one-quarter	of	the	earth’s	
total population at a time when communication over long distances was so 
slow	as	to	be	virtually	non-existent	(at	 least	by	today’s	standards), its genius 
49	 We	follow	Joseph	A.	Adler’s	translation	here.	See	his	Reconstructing the Confucian 
Dao: Zhu Xi’s Appropriation of Zhou Dunyi (Albany:	State	University	of	New	York	
Press, 2014),	especially	ch.4,	pp.111–136.	The	term	has	been	traditionally	translated	
into English as the “Supreme Ultimate.”
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lay	in	its	ability	to	balance	opposites	over	time	and	to	see	the	world	in	its	full	
complexity	as	a	system	of	dynamic	and	inherently	moral	relationships.	It	was,	
simultaneously,	both	centralized	and	de-centralized,	unified	and	divided,	 top-
down	 and	 bottom-up,	 integrated	 and	 autonomous,	 idealistic	 and	 realistic,	
favoring	continuity	but	enabling	change,	 rooted	 in	 the	past	but	preparing	for	
the	future,	encouraging	cooperation	but	permitting	competition.	Above	all,	 it	
brought	life	and	thought,	theory	and	practice,	into	a	synoptic	vision	of	moral	
truth.	 Everything	 was	 related	 to	 everything	 else,	 and	 moral	 responsibility	
grew naturally out of seeing the world as a vast network of relationships.
Third synthesis
 The third period of grand synthesis in Chinese history is the present, or 
more	 precisely,	 the	 immediate	 future.	 At	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 twenty-first	
century,	 three	major	 developments	 have	 converged,	 fundamentally	 changing	
the	 landscape	 of	 Chinese—and	 human—civilization	 and	 presenting	 an	 exis-
tential challenge on the same order of magnitude that occurred in the time of 
Confucius	 and	 Zhu	 Xi.	 First,	 the	 massive	 military	 power	 that	 Europe	 had	
acquired	 in	 the	 Scientific	 and	 Industrial	 Revolutions,	 and	 which	 had	 been	
directed	 at	 conquering	 overseas	 colonial	 empires	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	
was	 in	 the	first	half	of	 the	 twentieth	century	 turned	 inward	on	Europe	 itself.	
In two world wars only twenty years apart, Europe essentially self-destructed. 
By	the	middle	of	 the	 twentieth	century,	after	centuries	of	global	ascendancy,	
it	was	no	longer	a	player	on	the	world	scene.	The	second	major	development,	
in the second half of the twentieth century, was that the industrial revolution 
itself	 crossed	 the	 Pacific	Ocean	 to	Asia.	 China	 is	 now	 poised	 to	 reclaim	 its	
prior	status	as	the	main	engine	of	the	global	economy.	India	is	close	behind.	
	 The	third	major	development	was	globalization	itself.	Until	the	relatively	
recent past, the technology of transportation, communication, and information 
was such that most nations of the world could maintain at least the illusion of 
autonomy	and	independence.	Those	days,	for	the	first	time	in	human	history,	
are	 over.	 The	 global	 scale	 of	 the	 challenges	 we	 now	 face,	 among	 the	most	
urgent of which are climate change, disease, weapons proliferation, migration, 
and	 crime,	 transcend	 the	 artificial	 borders	 of	 our	 nation-states.	 Now	 the	
human	 species	 is	 facing	 an	 existential	 challenge	 to	 the	 future	welfare	of	 the	
entire	population	of	the	earth,	requiring	a	quantum	leap	in	the	level	of	coop-
eration on the same order of magnitude as the great institutional transitions of 
the past (from hunter-gatherer to village to city to state), this time to a truly 
global	 level	 of	 cooperation.	Yet	 the	 ideas	 and	 institutions	 of	 governance	we	
have	 inherited	 from	 the	 past	 are	 no	 longer	 adequate	 to	 address	 those	 chal-
lenges successfully. As in the late Zhou and the Northern Song, there is no 
conceptual framework that can facilitate cooperation among all the competing 
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interests	of	 the	existing	states.	 In	 the	absence	of	a	fundamental	 level	of	 trust	
that	 comes	 from	 a	 shared	 cultural	 background,	 or	 a	 shared	 system	 of	moral	
values,	or	a	fair	and	equitable	institution	of	administering	justice,	power	alone	
prevails. 
 Given our current predicament, and the similarity of the challenges we 
confront today to those of the two periods of Confucian synthesis noted 
above,	are	 there	any	insights	 that	could	be	gleaned	from	the	past	 to	apply	 to	
the present? Drawing from what Chinese historians and thinkers did in the 
past—as	 illustrated	 by	 all	 the	 terms	 covered	 in	 the	first	 part	 of	 this	 essay—
there	appear	to	be	at	least	three	necessary	conditions	for	a	sustainable	system	
of	global	governance:
1.	 	A	 unifying	 goal	 or	 system	 of	 thought	 based	 on	 evidence	 that	 has	
universal	credibility.
2.  A system that is fundamentally moral in order to inspire trust and 
cooperation.
3.	 	A	system	capable	of	 reconciling	opposites	and	competing	 interests—
which	 are	 inevitable	 in	 both	 nature	 and	 human	 society—in	 the	
context	of	a	larger	and	complementary	whole.
	 No	one	 system	of	 thought	now	 in	existence	 is	 able	 to	meet	 all	 three	of	
these	 criteria	 to	 provide	 a	 coherent	 vision	 for	 global	 governance	 capable	 of	
addressing	 the	 most	 urgent	 challenges	 of	 the	 twenty-first	 century.	 The	 dim	
outlines	of	such	a	 truly	global	worldview,	however,	may	already	be	lying	on	
the	table	 in	front	of	us.	Modern	science	certainly	possesses	 the	first	criterion	
of	universal	credibility	in	the	modern	world	in	spite	of	its	lack	of	the	second	
and	third	criteria.	Its	success	in	producing	the	scientific	and	industrial	revolu-
tions	 has	 bestowed	 a	 mantle	 of	 authority	 enjoyed	 by	 no	 other	 system	 of	
thought in the modern world. The Confucian worldview, on the other hand, 
certainly possesses the second and third criteria, and it has demonstrated its 
sustainability	 over	 the	 past	 two	 thousand	 years.	 If	 so,	 then	 the	 next	 logical	
question	 to	 ask	 is	whether	 there	 is	 any	 evidence	 that	 these	 two	worldviews,	
one	from	the	West	and	the	other	from	the	East,	might	be	combined	in	a	new	
synthesis	on	the	same	order	of	magnitude	accomplished	by	Confucius	himself	
and	then	by	Zhu	Xi.
	 There	 might	 well	 be.	 For	 decades,	 the	 basic	 mechanistic	 paradigm	 of	
Western science (based	on	nature,	of	 course)	 has	 itself	 already	been	moving	
in	a	direction	compatible	with	the	Chinese	paradigm	of	yin-yang complemen-
tarity of opposites (also	based	on	nature)	 employed	by	Zhu	Xi	 to	synthesize	
Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism. Many sciences are adopting a more 
holistic, systems, ecological, and interdisciplinary understanding focused on 
complex	 relationships	 and	 interconnections.	The	 new	 trend	 began	 a	 century	
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ago	 with	 quantum	 physics,	 when	 it	 was	 discovered	 that	 in	 the	 subatomic	
world, the classical laws of physics do not apply. Within the atom, matter and 
energy	 seem	 to	 be	 entirely	 complementary,	 perpetually	 changing	 back	 and	
forth	 in	 such	 a	mysterious	way	 that	 they	 are	best	 understood	 as	both	matter	
and energy simultaneously, depending entirely on how they are measured. 
Certainty	was	balanced	by	uncertainty,	objectivity	by	subjectivity,	determinant	
cause	by	probability,	 independent	variable	by	 interdependent	variable,	 linear	
by	 non-linear.	The	 core	 constituent	 substance	 of	 the	 cosmos,	moreover,	was	
not	a	static	material	reality	but	a	dynamic	shifting	network	of	relationships.	
	 Quantum	physics	was	thus	the	first	shot	across	the	bow	of	the	mechanistic	
perspective	that	until	then	had	characterized	the	modern	scientific	worldview.	
Gradually	 scientists	 in	 other	 fields,	 in	 ecology,	 biology,	 engineering,	mathe-
matics,	the	cognitive	sciences,	and	medicine,	began	to	notice	that	nature	was	
composed	of	 complex	 interactive	 systems	whose	properties	 emerged	only	 at	
the	 level	 of	 the	 whole,	 systems	 that	 could	 not	 be	 fully	 understood	 by	
analyzing the parts alone. The systems perspective has since continued to 
spread to other disciplines.50	In	other	words,	a	major	conceptual	shift	is	now	
beginning	 to	 take	 place	 in	 Western	 academic	 institutions,	 which,	 for	 more	
than a century, divided human knowledge into isolated silos known as disci-
plines and focused on them largely in isolation from the insights of other 
disciplines.	They	did	 this	 for	perfectly	 justifiable	 reasons	stemming	from	the	
need	 to	 specialize	 in	 order	 to	master	 the	 vast	 complexity	 of	 that	 knowledge	
base.	In	doing	so,	however,	they	lost	sight	of	the	interactions	of	those	parts	in	
a larger whole and are now moving to address that gap in the form of inter-
disciplinary programs and teams. In essence, science is now discovering a 
holistic	 perspective	 that	 has	 been	 at	 the	 core	 of	 the	 Chinese	 worldview	 for	
thousands of years, one that was most clearly articulated in the Daoist and 
Confucian concept of taiji.	 Like	 the	 spans	 of	 a	 bridge	 from	 two	 sides	 of	 a	
river	 joining	 in	 the	middle,	 the	 two	continents	of	 thought,	one	from	the	East	
and the other from the West, are now reaching out to each other. 
 If science is moving toward a more systemic, organic, and holistic 
perspective,	what	 about	 the	moral	 component,	 the	 second	 and	 third	 require-
ments	 mentioned	 above	 for	 a	 sustainable	 system	 of	 governance?	 Given	 the	
human potential for hatred, violence, cruelty, and self-destruction, how can 
one	 possibly	 expect	 people	 to	 acknowledge	 the	 existence	 of	 moral	 truth?	
Does not every society, including China, provide plenty of evidence of 
human perversity? Certainly. But the real issue is not whether humans can 
50	 For	 a	more	 complete	 understanding	 of	 the	 history	 of	 systems	 thinking,	 see	 Fritjof	
Capra and Pier Luigi Luisi, The Systems View of Life: A Unifying Vision (New York: 
Cambridge	University	Press,	2014).
21Some Keywords in Chinese Historical Thinking: An East Asian and World Perspective
become	 perfect.	 Rather,	 it	 is	 whether	 they	 can	 become	 better,	 able	 to	 curb	
their	 selfish	 desires	 enough	 to	 form	 cooperative	 civilized	 institutions.	 The	
institution	 of	 law	 goes	 a	 long	way	 in	making	 that	 possible.	 But	 in	 the	 end,	
law can only prevent people from doing what is wrong. It cannot inspire 
people to do what is right. Only morality can do that. Morality, in turn, 
comes from realizing that we are related to each other so intimately that 
harming	someone	else	is	harming	oneself,	and	that	benefiting	someone	else	is	
benefitting	 oneself.	 Morality,	 in	 other	 words,	 is	 based	 on	 relationships,	
starting	with	the	most	basic	relationship	in	nature—the	love	between	a	mother	
and	 her	 baby.	 Moral	 principle	 is	 not	 something	 imposed	 from	 without	 but	
something that grows naturally from within, something that stems from the 
essential unity of all things and from the need for the interrelated parts of a 
larger whole to cooperate with each other. That was the core insight of 
Confucius,	 of	 Zhu	 Xi,	 of	 the	 Buddha,	 and	 of	 all	 major	 religious	 figures	
throughout	 the	 human	 experience.	 It	 was	 behind	 the	 northern	 Song	 thinker	
Zhang Zai when he wrote in the “Western Inscription” the following passage 
basing	humanistic	ethics	on	the	unity	of	all	things:	“Heaven	is	my	father	and	
Earth	 is	 my	 mother,	 and	 even	 such	 a	 small	 creature	 as	 I	 finds	 an	 intimate	
place	 in	 their	midst.	Therefore	 that	which	 extends	 throughout	 the	universe	 I	
regard	as	my	body	and	that	which	directs	the	universe	I	regard	as	my	nature.	
All	people	are	my	brothers	and	sisters,	and	all	things	are	my	companions.”51
	 Science,	 starting	 with	 quantum	 physics,	 is	 now	 coming	 around	 to	 that	
unified	perspective	as	well	by	focusing	on	complementary	relationships	as	the	
basic	 principle	 of	 all	 reality,	 such	 that	 subject	 and	 object,	 observer	 and	
observed,	matter	and	energy,	are	in	a	mutual	and	interactive	dance—the	taiji. 
Perhaps	that	convergence	may	form	the	basis	for	a	new	synthesis	of	East	and	
West that can apply to our own age the li of principle, and carry forward into 
the	next	century	Sima	Qian’s	grand	intention	“to	explore	the	relation	between	
heaven	and	humanity.”	Just	as	Sima	Qian’s	Shiji was revolutionary in his own 
time	by	expanding	historical	experience	to	cover	all	of	the	known	world,	not	
just	 China,	 we	 are	 proposing	 that	 the	 principles	 of	 Chinese	 historiography	
covered	 in	 the	 first	 sections	 of	 this	 essay	 might	 usefully	 be	 expanded	 to	
comprehend	the	full	expanse	of	the	human	prospect	and	provide	the	language	
for	a	global	humanistic	ethics.	
	 Such	a	synthesis	of	 ideas	and	 institutions	now	requires	 the	participation	
of	 the	 entire	 human	 community.	 Asia,	 where	 60	 percent	 of	 the	 world’s	
51 Wm Theodore de Bary and Irene Bloom, eds., Sources of Chinese Tradition from 
Earliest Times to 1600, 2nd edition (New	York:	Columbia	University	 Press,	 1999), 
p.683.	 “乾稱父，坤稱母；予茲藐焉，乃混然中處。故天地之塞，吾其體；天地之帥，吾 其性。
民，吾同胞；物，吾與也.”
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population lives, must play a leadership role commensurate with its economic 
and	political	stature.	A	global	system	of	governance	that	does	not	incorporate	
Asian	perspectives	and	Asian	leadership	will	be	neither	workable	nor	sustain-
able.	 So	 what	 is	 needed	 now	 is	 a	 dialogue	 among	 Chinese	 philosophy	 and	
history,	 global	 ethical	 and	 religious	 traditions,	 and	 science	 to	 develop	 a	
common	 language	 of	 global	 humanism	 that	will	 lay	 the	 foundation	 for	 new	
institutions of trust and cooperation that transcend the nation-state and that 
can	bring	lasting	peace	to	the	world,	or	in	the	words	of	Confucius	himself—
ping tianxia 平天下. 
